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Abstract 
Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical identity theory requires modification when theorising about 
presentations of self on social media. This chapter contributes to these efforts, refining a 
conception of digital identities by differentiating them from ‘corporatised identities’. Armed with 
this new distinction, I ultimately argue that social media platforms’ production of corporatised 
identities undermines their users’ autonomy and digital well-being. This follows from the 
disentanglement of several commonly conflated concepts. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of 
presentation of self that I collectively refer to as ‘expressions of digital identity’. These digital 
performances (boyd 2007) and digital artefacts (Hogan 2010) are distinct, but often confused. Secondly, 
I contend this confusion results in the subsequent conflation of corporatised identities – poor 
approximations of actual digital identities, inferred and extrapolated by algorithms from individuals’ 
expressions of digital identity – with digital identities proper. Finally, and to demonstrate the 
normative implications of these clarifications, I utilise MacKenzie’s (2014, 2019) interpretation of 
relational autonomy to propose that designing social media sites around the production of 
corporatised identities, at the expense of encouraging genuine performances of digital identities, 
has undermined multiple dimensions of this vital liberal value. In particular, the pluralistic range 
of authentic preferences that should structure flourishing human lives are being flattened and 
replaced by commercial, consumerist preferences. For these reasons, amongst others, I contend 
that digital identities should once again come to drive individuals’ actions on social media sites. 
Only upon doing so can individuals’ autonomy, and control over their digital identities, be 
rendered compatible with social media.  
 
 
Keywords: Goffman, Identity, Relational Autonomy, Performance, Digital Artifact, Social Media 
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Introduction1 
As the online/offline distinction has blurred, digital identities have become part of daily life 
(Floridi 2011a, p. 477; Hongladarom 2011, p. 534), drawing critical attention to the “construction 
of personal identities in the infosphere” (Floridi 2011b, p. 550). Indeed, most liberal democratic 
citizens now remain constantly connected to the internet through their smartphones, continually 
contributing to and maintaining various online personas. Although not the only sites where such 
digital identities play an important role, they are perhaps most closely associated with social media 
platforms (Ellison and boyd 2007, p. 210)  – sites like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter.  
Accordingly, this chapter’s primary aim is one of precision: to refine a conception of digital 
identities and clarify their role(s) on modern social media sites. This objective is complicated by 
various usages of the term ‘digital identity’ in the literature so2, to be clear, I will utilise a performative 
account of digital identity, following in Goffman’s (1959) ‘dramaturgical’ footsteps, to consider 
how social media can affect individuals’ presentations of their identities online. This requires 
considering digital identities in a highly subjective and personal manner: as tapestries of 
intersubjective experiences, woven from ongoing presentations of self. Such identities are 
therefore understood to be inherently unique and always fluctuating, changing and reacting as they 
are continually performed, re-negotiated and re-presented to numerous audiences.  
This approach allows me to distinguish what I will argue are digital identities ‘proper’ from 
the substandard approximations of digital identities – which I term ‘corporatised identities’ – that 
social media companies covertly and algorithmically produce once they have identified individuals. 
Although often confused with one another, these two kinds of identity are distinct, and I will 
suggest that their conflation obscures fundamental, important questions surrounding the self and 
personal identities as they are continuously performed and constructed online.  
However, understanding how and why corporatised identities are being conflated with digital 
identities begins with recognising the differences between digital performances (boyd 2007) and digital 
artefacts (Hogan 2010) which, together, I term ‘expressions of digital identity’. Whilst these 
interrelated elements both express individuals’ identities and can be understood to be 
“presentations of self” (boyd 2007, p. 128), they do not contribute equally to individuals’ digital 
identities. Consequently, in the first two sections, I elucidate the differences between all these 
 
1 My thanks to Kai Spiekermann, Christopher Burr, and Laura Valentini for feedback on earlier drafts of this 
chapter. I am also grateful for Jaimie-Lee Freeman’s advice regarding conceptions of digital well-being.  
2 For instance, ‘digital identities’ can refer to merely technical tools for identification (Whitley et al. 2014, p. 18).  
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various related and often confused presentations of self (§1) and types of identities (§2). This 
chapter’s key theoretical contribution is thus the disentanglement of these concepts. 
This conceptual work offers real value to the political theorist. To illustrate, in the third and 
final section, I first draw on MacKenzie’s (2014, 2019) relational account of autonomy to argue 
that designing social media sites around the algorithmic production of corporatised identities, 
rather than encouraging the performance of digital identities, has undermined multiple dimensions 
of this vital liberal value, including self-governance, self-determination, and self-authorisation. 
Then, I utilise the eudaimonic account of well-being to frame this as a harm to individual 
functioning (Devine et al. 2008)3. In particular, I argue that the pluralistic range of authentic values 
and preferences that should structure flourishing human lives are being flattened and replaced by 
commercially-motivated, consumerist preferences. It is for these reasons, amongst others, that I 
contend digital identities should come once more to drive individuals’ actions on social media sites. 
In summary, this chapter has two main aims. Firstly, to reframe the debate surrounding the 
social media industry in terms of its negative effects on digital identities, not mere expressions of 
digital identity or the corporatised identities inferred from those expressions. And, secondly, from 
this new vantage point, to argue that (relational) autonomy, particularly over digital identity 
formation, is currently being impaired by social media companies and the algorithms that drive 
their systems. The conclusion then readily follows that the continued production of corporatised 
identities will be deeply damaging for individuals on a eudaimonic account of digital well-being.
 
3 The eudaimonic approach to well-being emphasises the individual’s flourishing and functioning, standing in 
contrast to hedonic approaches that focus on their subjective happiness alone (Ryan and Deci 2001).  
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§1 – Expressions of Digital Identity 
§1.1 – Digital Performances 
Preliminary examples of digital performances include posts, status updates, photos, likes, 
livestreams, tweets and retweets, as well as purchasing choices, ad clicks and many more 
interactions. Unsurprisingly, these kinds of expressions of digital identity bear strong resemblance 
to Goffman’s (1959) notion of a performance in the analogue world, whereby social interactions are 
metaphorically understood to be theatrical performances delivered to an audience4. For Goffman, 
performances amount to “all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by 
his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the 
observers” (Goffman 1959, p. 13). Such performances essentially aim to impress a particular 
identity upon an audience, and individuals then work to maintain that impression over time and 
ensure that their performances will be acknowledged as genuine (Goffman 1959, p. 10). Identity 
is therefore inherently social both because it is relational by nature (between actor and audience) 
and because performances are continually being “negotiated” with the audience (as those involved 
figure out how they relate to one another and try to shape how they are treated) (Phillips 2009, p. 
304). 
Importantly, however, individuals regularly perform many different identities depending on the 
situation, with various identities (or combinations of identities) being more or less salient in a given 
context (Davis 2016, p. 139). Individuals can thus be understood to wear different “masks” in 
varying situations that emphasise different aspects of their multiple identities (Bullingham and 
Vasconcelos 2013, p. 101). And, in much the same way, when performing online, individuals 
attempt to do the same (boyd and Heer 2006, p. 4).  
Asserting a digital identity also involves the performance of an idealised identity to an audience 
(Marwick and boyd 2011, p. 114). When it comes to self-presentation, social media users 
personalise their profile pages, choose photos and write pithy ‘bios’ that describe themselves, and 
generally attempt to present a coherent identity (Marwick and boyd 2011, p. 115). Furthermore, 
the content they actually perform takes specific forms (e.g. livestreaming, memes, etc.) that will be 
appropriate for the identity they are adopting. Online, this is particularly noticeable when 
considering the numerous personae that individuals create and maintain on different platforms – 
 
4 On social media audiences are often “imagined” as it is frequently impossible to know who will witness an 
individual’s performances (Marwick and boyd 2011, p. 115). 
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the sanitised performances most people give on LinkedIn, for example, are likely to be completely 
different to those in a WhatsApp chat with close friends.  
All of this performative work results in a unique impression of a digital identity being formed 
with and for the audience in question. Although mediated by technological means, digital identities 
thus have much in common with their analogue counterparts: they are the result of ongoing social 
processes of negotiation that stem from a struggle to present and maintain a particular impression 
of oneself in the eyes of another. Each identity is thus highly individualised, distinct and contextual, 
made up of the entirety of the relevant online interactions that have occurred between a given set 
of individuals up until that point5. They are, in other words, far more than the sum of their digital 
parts, a social impression that results from concerted efforts to present a particular version of the 
self.  
Nonetheless, a corollary of digital identities constantly evolving is that attending to each 
distinct performance in isolation – looking at a single tweet or status update – only provides part 
of the fuller picture. Each is only ever one expression of a salient identity (or several identities) in 
that specific context; one quarantined scene that constitutes only a slice of a larger part that is 
being performed over time, and which responds to audience reactions (Goffman 1959, p. 5). 
“Performances”, as Schieffelin argues (1998, p. 198), “are a living social activity […] While they 
refer to the past and plunge towards the future, they exist only in the present”. Identities are thus 
always being performed more or less effectively, with a fuller picture of each digital identity only 
emerging through repeated successful performances. This means that whilst a particular 
performance might therefore have contributed effectively towards an identity when first 
performed, it can easily fail to continue doing so when removed from its original situation, altering 
the meaning of that performance and its relevance to the individual. In the context of modern 
social media, this is not unproblematic, but to see why we must consider the other half of 
expressions of identity.  
 
§1.2 – Digital Artefacts 
Goffman chiefly investigated social interactions that occurred when “in one another’s 
immediate physical presence” (Goffman 1959, p. 8), so his work needs modification to remain 
relevant for internet communications. Largely, this requires acknowledging that the digital traces 
of performances which are recorded by social media platforms actually fail to meet Goffman’s 
 
5 This thumbnail sketch of a digital identity should suffice until the concept is more thoroughly fleshed out in §2.3. 
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criteria for a performance (Hogan 2010, p. 377). Whilst these digital remnants of a performance 
are still undeniably “a form of presentation of self” (Hogan 2010, p. 377), once later accessed and 
processed it would be inaccurate to call them performances. Instead, they are better understood 
(metaphorically-speaking) as online “exhibitions” made up of stored performances that are recalled 
and re-presented to audiences as required – a new kind of expression of digital identity that Hogan 
terms “artifacts”6 (Hogan 2010, p. 381). Thus, although similar, digital performances and digital 
artefacts are not in fact identical.  
This terminological change is primarily required for two reasons. Firstly, stored artefactual 
performances are endlessly re-presented by social media companies to different audiences, not just 
the audience to which the performance was originally delivered, and, secondly, this re-presentation 
is done by algorithmic “curators” that make complex and opaque decisions when selecting what 
to exhibit (Hogan 2010, p. 380). For instance, the audience that watches a videogaming live-stream 
in the moment are no doubt exposed to a full-on performance, but if a recording is made available 
to view a year later, it is likely that a completely different audience is being shown that artefact, 
selected by an algorithm trying to maximise engagement7 (Hogan 2010, p. 381).  
Exhibitions are therefore not made up of true digital performances but assembled from the 
digital artefacts of what used to be performances: the digital traces of an individual’s identity as it 
was at a particular moment. Consequently, whilst earlier researchers recognised that without “live” 
updates social media profiles became “frozen performances” and “outdated representations of the 
self” (boyd and Heer 2006, p. 9), Hogan successfully formulates the need to move beyond 
performances altogether and extricates the similar, but distinct, concept of a digital artefact.  
Reconsidering the preliminary examples of performances that began our discussion, we can 
now see that many decay in just this way. Still, in my taxonomy, both digital artefacts and digital 
performances are merely expressions of digital identities which, when taken together, are not 
equivalent to digital identities themselves (See Fig. 1). This is because digital identities emerge from 
digital performances but are not reducible to them. Nonetheless, when considering social media 
and its normative issues, analysis often focuses on these expressions of digital identity, taken in 
part or as a whole, as these are easy to access and link back to an identified individual8. After all, it 
is now trivial for social media companies to harvest and store vast stores of digital data. But, 
 
6 Hogan uses the American spelling, but I have opted for the British ‘artefacts’.  
7 E.g. Facebook’s ‘memories’: curated content from an individual’s past which generated the most engagement at 
the time is selectively re-presented to them today to share to new audiences. For more, see: (Hod 2018). 
8 Consider, for example, studies charting racism on Twitter (Chaudhry 2015) or fake news on Facebook (Bakir 
and McStay 2018) that focus on expressions of digital identity rather than individuals’ actual digital identities. 
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unfortunately, much of the analysis also ends here, conflating digital performances and digital 
artefacts despite them not being equally relevant to digital identities.  
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic delineating an individual’s various kinds of identities, and their  
relationships to different presentations of self, both online and offline 
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§2 – From Expressions to Identities 
To maximise engagement, and therefore advertising revenues, social media sites strive to show 
individuals content that ‘people like them’ have interacted with (Wu 2017) – i.e. identify their digital 
identity markers (Cheney-Lippold 2011, p. 165). To do so, machine learning algorithms are used 
to infer anything from an individual’s “sensitive attributes (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation)” 
to their interests and “opinions (e.g., political stances)” from the data they post and consume9 
(Wachter and Mittelstadt 2019, p. 4). These psychometric categorisations allow advertisements 
(and content) to be targeted at specific ‘audiences’ (Bay 2018, p. 1723) – the same process by which 
Cambridge Analytica categorised possible voters into “universes” and social marketeers sort 
potential customers into “buckets” (Bartlett 2018, p. 83). Does this categorisation, however, 
amount to individuals being assigned a digital identity based on their digital performances?  
I think not. Indeed, I believe that conflating digital artefacts and digital performances has led 
to an equivocation between digital identities and corporatised identities – a term for the audiences, 
buckets and universes used to wrangle economically-exploitable categories out of the masses of 
data generated by social media usage. These corporate amalgamations of digital identities are not 
digital identities proper (Fig. 2) and, as I will demonstrate, prioritising their production at the 
expense of digital identities themselves results in commercial values being forcefully impressed 
upon individuals. The term ‘corporatised’ is thus fitting, as it means to make something “corporate 
by introducing or imposing the structures, practices, or values associated with a large business 
corporation; to commercialize” and, hence, “to deprive” that thing “of independence or individual 
character” (OED Online 2006). Bearing this definition in mind, I will argue below that the unique, 
fluctuating digital identities that individuals seek to create and maintain over social media are being 
corrupted by the production of corporatised identities that identify individuals for advertising and 
tracking purposes. Indeed, as it will transpire, it is damaging to confuse this forensic, corporate 
process of individuation and identity assignment with the fluid and social construction of digital 
identities, as production of the former is harmful to individuals’ digital well-being in its current 
form.  
 
 
9 As these conclusions often cannot be understood by humans such algorithms are often described as being 
‘opaque’ (Villaronga et al. 2018, p. 308). 
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Figure 2. A revised schematic accounting for an individual’s ‘corporatised identities’  
 
§2.1 – Corporatised Identities 
Corporatised identities are no more than commercially useful extrapolations inferred from 
the deluge of expressions of digital identity recorded by social media companies. Whilst such 
“social sorting” (Lyon 2014, p. 10) no doubt captures, perhaps quite accurately, elements of a 
performed identity, it therefore cannot ever hope to emulate or equal an individual’s ever-changing 
digital identities. There are at least four reasons for this.  
Firstly, algorithmically generating corporatised identities relies on analysing many different 
individuals’ expressions of digital identity together (de Vries 2010, p. 77; Manders-Huits 2010, p. 
45), comparing them to draw useful boundaries around similar groups (Wachter and Mittelstadt 
2019, p. 13). Doing so allows social media companies to “draw non-intuitive and unverifiable 
inferences and predictions about the behaviors, preferences, and private lives of individuals” 
(Wachter and Mittelstadt 2019, p. 4). Numerous individuals’ expressions of digital identity are thus 
constantly being processed into discrete, machine-readable categories. At most, this means that 
what Goffman would term ‘group’ or ‘role’ identities might be understood by social media 
companies, inferred from common features of a population, but not an individual’s digital 
identities. Indeed, this is inevitable, as individuals are only ever members of a category for their 
algorithms – points in a dataset at a relative level of abstraction rather than persons (Cheney-
Lippold 2011, p. 176). 
Secondly, because new data are always being gathered, the algorithms continually redefine and 
refine the boundaries of corporatised identities (O’Neill 2016), tweaking them to improve their 
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effectiveness10 (de Vries 2010, p. 81). Who I ‘am’ (which categories describe me) is therefore in a 
constant state of flux, not only due to my actions, but also how the algorithm understands those 
actions to relate to others’. Whilst I may be statistically identified as ‘male’ today, tomorrow I might 
be recategorised as ‘female’ based on new performances (Cheney-Lippold 2011, p. 173). When 
this happens, however, the entire advertising infrastructure shifts to treat me completely differently, 
targeting me with different adverts and content, destabilising the contexts in which I act online. 
This means that algorithms now partially co-create and “supplement existing discursive 
understandings of a category” (Cheney-Lippold 2011, p. 173). Gender classifications are just one 
example, but they illustrate that fickle, group-level distinctions define corporatised identities, not 
anything approaching the granularity of an individual’s actual performed identity. In contrast, as 
we have already seen from Goffman, individuals generally try to consistently perform coherent 
identities across situations, doing intersubjective work to ensure their identities are being correctly 
understood. This clearly conflicts with the continuous modulation of categories and the pursuit of 
economically effective, but not necessarily accurate, categorisations.  
The third difference stems from the commercial motivations behind this process. Individuals 
are categorised to show them content that similar users have found engaging (de Vries 2010, p. 
77), but also to make decisions “about how best to predict, persuade, and ultimately control the 
behaviour of the user” (Burr and Cristianini 2019, p. 463). The end goal of this process, after all, 
is converting attention into profit through various monetisation techniques11 (Wu 2017; Zuboff 
2015). So, despite rhetorical protestations to the contrary, social media companies are not 
audiences seeking to truly interact with the performing individual, despite the “power of 
performativity” turning “crucially on its interactive edge” and the “relationship” between performer 
and audience (Schieffelin 1998, p. 200). Rather, leveraging their ubiquity as platforms, these 
companies are inserting themselves between genuinely interacting individuals as parasitic accessories 
to their performances in order to monetise their interactions.  
Accordingly, social media companies are agnostic about digital identities tout court, because 
only comparable, machine-readable identity characteristics need to be inferred from individuals’ 
expressions of digital identity. Indeed, only those inferences that might be economically-
exploitable are relevant for rendering their vast stores of raw data useful (Cheney-Lippold 2011, p. 
170). Elements of identities that do not serve this purpose or cannot be inferred from expressions 
 
10 This distinguishes corporatised identities from idealised identities that shape individuals’ performances. The 
former are transient, with their boundaries constantly being re-drawn, whilst the latter are socially-determined and 
so somewhat fixed by the possibilities of a particular society.  
11 International markets, not concern for “data justice” or ethics, therefore drives this process (Taylor 2017, p. 3). 
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of digital identity are therefore discarded or computationally unobservable, leaving companies with 
limited, but commercially useful, shadows of a potential consumer’s identities.  
Fourth, and finally, this means that digital performances and artefacts are wilfully conflated 
and mined in search of any exploitable insights. My past is, after all, as exploitable as who I now 
am and wish to be. Beyond the conflation of self and other we have discussed, past and present, 
performance and artefact, and all an individual’s multiple identities, too, are bundled together and 
mined for commercial predictions. As such, whilst corporatised identities reflect salient, 
generalisable features of the expressions of digital identity that linger in the network and can be 
computationally modelled (itself a large caveat) (Hildebrandt 2019, p. 92), due to their indiscriminate 
and inferential construction they will never be equivalent in terms of detail, scope or 
contemporaneity to any true digital identity. No genuine consideration of self – no relational, 
negotiated social interaction – occurs, in favour of inferences derived from collated and often 
outdated expressions of self.  
To appreciate this, recall the imagery of artefacts and exhibitions. Evidently, an archaeologist 
cannot ‘know’ the identity of an individual they find buried, beyond perhaps in the simple sense 
of identification, because they never had a social relationship with them. At best they might be 
able to infer some educated guesses from artefacts left behind (e.g. diaries). But, similarly, the 
algorithms utilised by social media companies can do little better, if at all, despite such guesses 
being how these companies claim to ‘know’ their users. In reality, both archaeologist and algorithm 
can at best only speculate, as they are removed from their objects of interest – there are no 
negotiated performances occurring between them. 
Furthermore, whilst algorithms do not only consider digital artefacts – they can also access 
ongoing performances – the former are almost certainly given more weight in their categorisations 
than a human might. Whilst human memories are relatively undependable, and analogue 
performances can fade over time, data storage is cheap and reliable, so digital performances are 
rarely, if ever, ‘forgotten’12 (Manders-Huits 2010, p. 52). But this means that artefacts can easily 
outweigh those most fleeting performances an individual is currently giving. A recently reformed 
smoker might thus continue to be pigeon-holed by adverts that seek to sell a product aimed at 
who they were but no longer wish to be.  
 
§2.2 – Initial Issues with Corporatised Identities 
 
12 Unless legally obligated to ‘forget’ by, e.g., Article 17 of the European General Data Protection Regulation. 
For more, see: (Politou et al. 2018; Villaronga et al. 2018). 
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Corporatised identities, then, are clearly not digital identities. Nonetheless, like many similar 
“flawed models” (Bridle 2018, p. 34), corporatised identities can exert a potentially problematic 
influence on the reality they are only meant to be modelling (Hildebrandt 2019, pp. 91–92). In 
practice this means, once assigned a corporatised identity, individuals are repeatedly shown content 
matched to their ‘type’. A cycle of reinforcement therefore proceeds (Elmer 2003), as individuals 
are shown digital artefacts nudging them to act in ways which re-confirm the original categorisation, 
in turn deepening the algorithm’s confidence in a correct classification13 (Lessig 1999, p. 154). 
Unsurprisingly, this then feeds back into the identity formulation process and individuals’ future 
performances (Burr et al. 2018; de Vries 2010). As Lanier (1995, p. 67) colourfully puts it, the result 
is that individuals are reduced to a “cartoon model” of their purported interests, and one that is 
self-reinforcing14. This cannot authentically be described as mapping an identity, though, but at 
least partially defining it – shaping fluid human identities to match rigid categories that algorithms 
can compute, rather than reflecting the complexities of identities that actually exist ‘out there’ in 
the social world.  
However, at this point a sceptical reader might respond that, in everyday life, we are also 
always sorting people into various groups, getting those classifications wrong and recategorizing 
people – and that a central part of identity construction involves negotiating with our peers where 
we stand in their respective social categories. Are social media companies’ categorisations not just 
further examples this?  
This, I believe, is a misunderstanding – social media companies’ classifications are markedly 
different. Ordinarily, the categorisation (or stereotyping, pigeon-holing, and so on) that individuals 
do to one another is multifarious; varied beliefs and biases mean everyone treats each other in slightly 
different ways. This results in exposure to a valuable plurality of viewpoints, against which 
individuals can examine their own lives and identity trajectories (See, e.g. Muldoon 2015, pp. 182–
184) – empowering them to figure out who they want to be, which identities to perform and how 
they want to be seen by others. It supports, in other words, Mill’s “experiments of living” (Mill 
1984, p. 115), contributing directly towards their well-being. And, far from being undesirable, this 
helps individuals to grow and explore new identities, contributing to a flourishing pool of potential 
lifestyles in liberal society15.  
 
13 Success is achieved when a “categorization fits the behavior of a user”, without regard for whether a user 
actually “embodies that category” (Cheney-Lippold 2011, p. 179). 
14 My thanks to Christopher Burr for drawing my attention to this formulation of the issue. 
15 I gesture here to the rich liberal literature on value pluralism. For more, see e.g. (Crowder 1998; Galston 1999). 
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Online, however, things are different. As we have seen, the construction methods of 
corporatised identities ensure that the only categorisations made by social media companies are 
those which ultimately serve a narrowly single-minded and economic impetus. This is radically 
unlike the diverse stereotyping and categorising that friends, colleagues and strangers do. Indeed, 
appreciating this “strips away the illusion that the networked form has some kind of indigenous 
moral content” to reveal the socially-parasitic, commercial impetus behind social media’s 
supposedly-social design, and shows that individuals trying to authentically socially interact are 
actually being used as the “brazen means to others’ commercial ends”  (Zuboff 2019a, p. 19). I 
will return to the normative implications of this shortly.  
 
§2.3 – Digital Identities 
Nonetheless, having distinguished corporatised identities, we can now better ascertain the 
nature of digital identities themselves. An immediate and major difference is that digital identities, 
much like their analogue equivalents, are intensely personal and so largely defined by their 
uniqueness. Whilst corporatised identities attend to similarity and sameness at the level of 
categories, digital identities are characterised by their distinctive individuality at the level of persons; 
no two digital identities will likely ever be the same in either aspiration or performance.  
Ontologically, this follows from the “informational nature” of identities, according to which 
digital identities are comprised of the rich perceptions (or narratives) generated by an individuals’ 
actions (Floridi 2011b, p. 556), far beyond those data required for identification and monetary 
exploitation. Indeed, it is through individuals experiencing and remembering digital social 
interactions that they perceive others’ complex identities. Since two individuals’ minds will never 
possess all the same information, they will never perform identical identities, as the manifold 
diversity of previous experiences (stored as memories) will frame and condition their future 
interactions. As such, two distinct individuals will always interact in unique ways and perform 
subtly different identities, whether online or offline.  
Another vital difference is that, both online and offline, the motivation for identity-relevant 
action stems from the desire to perform a particular idealised identity successfully. Evidently digital 
identities, not corporatised identities, drive this process online, not least because individuals usually 
lack direct epistemic access to the corporatised identities that companies extrapolate. Although 
moving performances online therefore changes the ways in which successful negotiation might be 
achieved, and introduces new mechanisms and techniques for identity management, the 
fundamental aim – of successful performance – remains consistent. This aim, crucially, is not one 
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shared by corporatised identities and the social media companies that create them for an 
identification and governance agenda. 
As we have seen, the creation of corporatised identities is principally commercially motivated. 
As such, whilst digital identities primarily obtain between persons, existing as shared constructions 
regardless of the medium by which they are performed, corporatised identities exist on mainframes, 
belonging to the companies that generate them. The former are irreducibly social; negotiated, 
ongoing, and reciprocal. By contrast, the latter are one-sided, privileged and readily exploited by 
one party. Even if companies partially construct the performance environment, conditioning 
individuals’ performances, corporatised identities are not a shared endeavour but a powerful tool 
for behavioural manipulation16.  
Similarly, the importance of digital performances to digital identities, rather than digital artefacts, 
cannot be stressed enough. Recalling how misguided it would be to suggest that an archaeologist 
‘knows’ a corpse, the centrality of intersubjective online experience to digital identities should now 
be clear. A performance’s ephemeral nature stems directly from this intersubjectivity, as without 
the possibility of reacting and adapting to an audience what is actually being created is a digital 
artefact, because performances “exist only in the present”17(Schieffelin 1998, p. 198). Identities are 
fluid and, although somewhat fixed idealisations shape how individuals act, they are not fixed in 
the manner which corporatised identities require to enable artificial comprehension (Hildebrandt 
2019, p. 91). This conflicts with the desire to categorise that provokes social media companies’ 
constructions of corporatised identities in the first place. And, even though the boundaries of 
corporatised identities are constantly changing, this does not emulate the fluidity that runs through 
an individual’s intentional, shifting performances of an identity. Algorithmic redefinition is a 
disjointed exercise in reactive speculation, not one of coherent but evolving presentation.  
Credence is lent to this claim of fluidity, or aversion to identity-fixing, by appeal to 
psychological studies. For instance, being confronted with artefacts that individuals do not 
currently identify with, even if those prior performances were integral to their identity at the time, 
can generate significant discomfort (Tian 2017, p. 204). Such “mismatched expectations” 
surrounding who individuals believe themselves to be can lead, in particular, to embarrassment 
and anxiety (Tian 2017, p. 205). As I have shown, this is because identities are ongoing and 
 
16 Facebook’s emotional contagion experiments, for instance, explored their ability to influence individuals’ 
mental states without their knowledge (Kramer et al. 2014). For further discussion of behavioural manipulation 
in the context of digital well-being, see (Klenk, this collection). In particular, Klenk’s assertion that such 
manipulation can deny individuals both autonomy and control over valuable aspects of their lives chimes well 
with the argument I later advance in §3.  
17 That said, prior performances “inform present ones” (Davis 2014, p. 514), so there is some continuity of identity. 
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multifaceted constructions, constantly changing and adapting. Fixing snapshots of identities in 
social media networks therefore creates the potential for conflicts between currently lived identities 
and the fossilised remains of identities that have been left behind.  
This leads to a final key insight regarding the nature of digital identities. As a “continuous” 
process of reflection, identity work consists in “evaluating and identifying with one’s attributed 
identifications” (Manders-Huits 2010, p. 50, emphasis mine). Individuals, in other words, must 
feel that the identities they are performing are truly ‘theirs’. In Paul Ricoeur’s terminology, this 
feeling links to an individual’s ipse identities, those which they first-personally experience and 
recognise as their “unique selfhood” (de Vries 2010, p. 74). People clearly identify with their digital 
identities, given their continued attempts to present them, but would not necessarily feel the same 
about a corporatised one – indeed, like with any other group categorisation, people often find it 
alienating, arresting or uncomfortable to see how they have been (mis)characterised (de Vries 2010, 
p. 81; Newman and Newman 2001, p. 526). This arises from indignance; a feeling that ‘that’s not 
who I am’.  
Bearing all of this in mind, I therefore tentatively submit that digital identities should once 
again be allowed to underpin individuals’ online performances on social media if we are to avoid 
these issues. Indeed, before corporatised identities were created, digital identities surely did fulfil 
this role: individuals intersubjectively performed their identities, utilising the internet to explore 
them in new ways. With the increasing production of corporatised identities, though, individuals’ 
digital identities – those they lived and felt to be their own – have been systematically displaced. 
Instead, as platforms have realised their potential monetary value, they have begun building and 
exploiting corporatised identities at the expense of digital identities. This development, however, 
has damaging corollary effects: namely, reducing individuals’ autonomy over their own identities 
and how they are presented to others. And, having already touched on these issues, we are now 
better equipped to explore them in detail.   
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§3 – Relational Autonomy and the Harms of Corporatised Identities   
Clearly, as corporatised identities are algorithmically generated behind closed doors, 
individuals cannot straightforwardly exercise autonomy over these identities. However, at the same 
time, corporatised identities readily condition individuals’ social contexts, enabling social media 
companies to exert influence over their digital well-being. This primarily occurs through the 
filtering of information, as these companies control the internet’s advertising and social 
infrastructures – a fact that is potentially worrying because, as individuals, “we interact, flourish, 
or suffer depending on the flows of information in which we partake” (Floridi 2019, p. 379). But, 
again, because all this filtering is oriented towards maximising engagement, ad clicks and revenue, 
social media sites have been redesigned to be increasingly addictive (Andreassen 2015). After all, 
for these companies we only “appear as statistical objects of study, abstracted from our personal 
preferences and life plans, and from our individual capacities and freedom to choose” (Manders-
Huits 2010, p. 45).  
In other words, a substantial problem with producing corporatised identities is that individuals 
are not treated as autonomous agents – they are not afforded adequate moral concern for their 
capacity to choose. This has significant implications for eudaimonic approaches to well-being, 
because possessing sufficient autonomy is vital (Deci and Ryan 2008, p. 6). Indeed, autonomy is 
of central importance to all conceptions of the “fully functioning person” that defines eudaimonic 
well-being (Ryan and Deci 2001, p. 161)18. Harm to an individual’s digital well-being is therefore 
an inevitable outcome of the production of corporatised identities if this process is damaging to 
autonomy. Thus, to support these conclusions, the remainder of this section fleshes out a 
particular conception of relational autonomy and explores how it is adversely affected by 
corporatised identities. 
 
§3.1 – A General Account of Relational Autonomy  
Respect for individual autonomy is woven into the very fabric of liberal democracies as a 
“cardinal moral value” defended morally and in law (MacKenzie 2008, p. 512). Traditional 
understandings of autonomy, however, have been criticised as excessively masculine, 
individualistic and atomistic, driving the development of relational approaches to autonomy that 
 
18 See (Calvo, Peters, Vold, Ryan, this collection) for more on this relationship, as seen through the lens of self-
determination theory. Their work make great strides towards the development of a more systematic approach to 
diagnosing autonomy-compromising digital design.  
Charlie Harry Smith Corporatised Identities ≠ Digital Identities *Preprint* 
 17 
seek to recognise individuals as “emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling” (MacKenzie 
and Stoljar 2000, p. 21). At a fundamental level, all such theorists agree that individuals are 
irreducibly socially rooted and that their “identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships” (MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000, p. 4). The parallels with the intersubjective account 
of identity above should therefore be self-evident, and this also sits comfortably with eudaimonic 
well-being’s recognition of the need for an “appropriate and situated notion of autonomy” (Devine 
et al. 2008, p. 132). Nonetheless, navigating the numerous strands of relational autonomy would 
be beyond our requirements19, as MacKenzie (2014, 2019) has developed a multidimensional 
model that integrates the various approaches along three interrelated axes. These are: 
 
• Self-governance, which “involves having the skills and capacities necessary to make choices and 
enact decisions that express, or cohere with, one’s reflectively constituted diachronic 
practical identity” (MacKenzie 2014, p. 17); 
• Self-determination, which “involves having the freedom and opportunities to make and enact 
choices of practical import to one’s life, that is, choices about what to value, who to be, and 
what to do” (MacKenzie 2014, p. 17); and, 
• Self-authorization, which “involves regarding oneself as having the normative authority to be 
self-determining and self-governing… [i.e.] authorized to exercise practical control over 
one’s life, to determine one’s own reasons for action, and to define one’s values and identity-
shaping practical commitments” (MacKenzie 2014, p. 18). 
 
Along each dimension, various circumstances can therefore either support or restrict an 
individual’s autonomy. This includes internal conditions, such as the individual’s own psychology, 
as well as external conditions, like  “social norms, institutions, practices, and relationships” that 
can “effectively limit the range of significant options available” (MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000, p. 
22). Brainwashing children, for instance, can not only limit their beliefs and desires to those their 
parents find acceptable, but can also impede the development of their critical faculties, leading to 
dependencies. Relational approaches to autonomy recognise that this would rob them of authority 
over their own lives, replacing their freedom to live as they wish with a narrow conception of the 
good life. And, in line with this, the eudaimonic understanding of well-being, too, explicitly 
recognises the detrimental effects for well-being entailed by such losses to autonomy (Devine et 
al. 2008, p. 113). 
 
19 See, e.g.: (Barclay 2000; Baumann 2008; Christman 2004; MacKenzie 2014; Westlund 2009).  
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As I will now demonstrate, all three dimensions of MacKenzie’s model can ground criticisms 
of corporatised identities. Consequently, I remain broadly neutral towards particular 
interpretations of relational autonomy because, if deploying corporatised identities potentially 
impinges upon elements of all three axes, it would suggest they are generally incompatible with 
relational autonomy and so undermine digital well-being, too. If liberal democracies seek to 
promote respect for relational autonomy, then I propose the practice of creating corporatised 
identities should thus be altered – or even rejected altogether. Regardless, MacKenzie’s model 
illuminates the theoretical utility of distinguishing corporatised identities from the digital.  
 
§3.2.1 – Self-Governance 
The dimension of self-governance fundamentally considers (i) the individual’s competency or 
internal capabilities to make and act upon free decisions in line with their wishes, and (ii) whether 
their choices and preferences are their own – i.e. the authenticity of their intentions (MacKenzie 
2019, p. 149). It particularly focuses on the individual’s moral psychology; whether they possess 
the capacity to be autonomous, or whether disability or dependency has made them unable to 
form or execute their intentions (MacKenzie 2019, p. 147). As a relational theory, however, 
attention is also paid to the social and institutional environment required for the development and 
sustenance of effective self-governance, and issues such as stereotyping and adaptive preferences 
pertinently illustrate how inauthenticity can be forced upon individuals (MacKenzie 2014, p. 32), 
alienating them from themselves and generating internal conflict over their identity and value 
commitments (see e.g. Khader 2011).  
Where corporatised identities are utilised, both competency and authenticity conditions are 
potentially undermined, both online and offline. Firstly, when individuals rely on algorithms to 
recommend purchasing choices, they can often “surrender to technology” and settle for inferior 
products (Banker and Khetani 2019, p. 2)20. Importantly, corporatised identities underpin these 
recommender systems, as without companies ‘understanding’ individuals they cannot guide their 
actions. This, however, can undermine an individual’s competency and breed dependence, with 
algorithms simplifying complex situations and nudging users into commercially-motivated actions 
(Hildebrandt 2019, p. 105) despite these products affecting how individuals can perform identities, 
and despite purchasing them in itself being a kind of identity performance. Consider, for instance, 
 
20  Conversely, individuals’ best interests can sometimes be best served by autonomously surrendering to 
technology, as is the case with fitness trackers. However, concerns surrounding dependence clearly remain in 
these cases.  
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Facebook and Google recommending ‘promoted’ restaurants paying for more exposure. But, in 
relying on recommendations, individuals plainly cede competency and opportunity for self-
governance to a company using the influence granted by corporatised identities for profit-related 
purposes.  
Secondly, algorithmic reliance can also remove opportunities for the development and 
performance of authentic digital identities. Algorithms can nudge us, for instance, to buy more than 
we need, not only reducing self-control but also promoting consumerism – identity traits that 
individuals may not reflexively endorse. Furthermore, as these systems expand beyond simple 
purchases it will only become more difficult to avoid their recommendations. The game ‘Pokémon 
Go’, for instance, was quietly monetised by Google/Alphabet through the sale of virtual land in 
real-world locations. So, companies like Starbucks paid for in-game monsters to reside near their 
cafés, herding players to stores and boosting sales, whilst players were not informed this is how 
monsters were distributed (Zuboff 2019b, ch. 10). Following the blockbuster success of this 
gambit21, a business model built on covertly manipulating individuals has thus been realised, with 
social media companies keen to release the latent value of vast stores of digital identity data 
(Zuboff 2019a, p. 19). Nonetheless, if the values that individuals are pushed to endorse through 
these systems are not their own, then authenticity is lost, with commercial values supplanted for 
individuals’ own. In this case, for example, a desire for videogaming (a kind of digital identity 
performance) in nature is being contorted into an opportunity for coffee sales. Consequently, the 
rich variety of preferences that underpin a digital identity are being collapsed or flattened in favour 
of those preferences which can be economically exploited, stymieing the authentic development 
of individuals’ varied preferences and harming their well-being. Indeed, these systems all display 
significant biases for increasing “sales, ad exposure, user engagement, and […] other strategic goals” 
that are likely to conflict with an individual’s own values (Banker and Khetani 2019, p. 4).  
Corporatised identities are thus leveraged to target individuals with sophisticated behavioural 
manipulation systems designed to service these companies bottom lines at the expense of an 
individual’s capabilities for self-governance, undermining both the authenticity of their preferences 
and potentially their competency to make agential decisions. Whilst these systems are only just 
emerging, the potentially damaging effects for digital identities are serious: with diminished self-
governance, individuals will be less able decide what identities to perform, depending on 
algorithms whilst being herded into performing identities that suit a commercialised agenda. 
Indeed, because these autonomy-damaging systems all rely on corporatised identities to operate, 
 
21 Pokémon Go broke five world records, including fastest mobile game to gross $100m (Swatman 2016). 
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this gives prima facie reasons, on grounds of preserving self-governance, to want digital identities 
to underpin individuals’ actions on social media instead.  Individuals, after all, retain far more 
control over digital identities than the corporatised identities companies generate from harvesting 
their online interactions.  
 
§3.2.2 – Self-Determination 
The dimension of self-determination is preoccupied with external, structural threats to 
autonomy and its development in individuals. MacKenzie defines these in terms of (i) freedom 
conditions – the personal and political liberties protecting individuals from coercion, domination 
and exploitation (MacKenzie 2014, p. 25) – and (ii) opportunity conditions, which canvas the 
significant options individuals can choose from in society (MacKenzie 2014, p. 26). The two are 
interlinked, as in situations where liberties have been curtailed, individuals often also possess 
inadequate or insufficient meaningful life-options to choose from, and so their autonomous status 
is undermined (MacKenzie 2019, p. 147). In particular, MacKenzie is clear that having significant 
options cannot be reduced to an unlimited “array of consumer choices” (MacKenzie 2019, p. 148); 
there must be a legitimate variety of life-choices available for individuals to pursue, free from 
dominating forms of power and interference, for self-determination to be achieved.  
Social media companies cannot currently forcibly curtail their users’ freedoms. However, they 
are nevertheless narrowing the range of available significant opportunities. Filter bubbles and echo 
chambers, for example, are polarising individuals’ identities, making their beliefs more extreme 
(Burr et al. 2018; Pariser 2012). Specifically, the most engaging emotions are anger, jealousy and 
outrage, so content generating these reactions is shown to individuals more often (Fan et al. 2014). 
Whilst (negatively speaking) individuals can post what they like, as only illegal and explicit materials 
are actively censored, the addictive mechanisms that elicit individual contributions are thus tuned 
to amplify and encourage content that generates these extreme emotions, polarising discourse. 
Consciously or not, if they wish to maximise engagement with friends, individuals are therefore 
conditioned to post such content by an external, coercive algorithmic force that only understands 
the world through corporatised identities. To expound on this point, consider the rise of 
‘influencers’ on social media.  
Influencers are the celebrities of social media culture (Cotter 2019, p. 896). Essentially, they 
sell a lifestyle through the products that go with it, and therefore rent themselves as vehicles for 
advertisements on social media with the hopes of nudging their followers into purchasing 
sponsored products (Brown and Hayes 2008). Accordingly, many potentially authentic social 
relationships between followers and influencers are reduced to little more than a friendly-faced 
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exchange of possible consumer choices. This is only compounded by the planned nature of many 
influencer endorsements – posts must often be signed off by advertising executives months in 
advance, meaning that such posts are artefacts, not intersubjective performances, long before they 
have even been posted. But, accordingly, influencers’ identities are definingly shaped by the 
algorithms aimed at promoting those who best maximise engagement and revenues22 (Cotter 2019, 
p. 901). Success on Instagram, after all, requires moulding your identity into one that the algorithm 
will favour.  
This has clear determining effects on influencers’ identities but also affects the performances 
and identities of their followers – normal people interacting in the disguised marketplaces of social 
media. This is because companies that competitively sponsor influencers usually gain the most 
publicity. Importantly for self-determination, however, this comes at the expense of significant 
alternative options – even those that might be free – regardless of whether the alternatives might 
actually be in individuals’ better interests, or better support their social interactions. After all, 
simply having more (purchasing) options is not enough; alternatives must also be significant as, “if 
one has an inadequate range of significant options to choose from, one’s autonomy is diminished” 
(Brison 2000, p. 285).  
Even putting influencers aside, however, social media companies generally control which of 
individuals’ digital identity performances are revealed to others; algorithms, after all, are constantly 
using corporatised identities to decide which posts to highlight to friends or not. Whilst self-
determination over digital identities is thus not entirely undermined by these companies, the 
structural barriers to resisting their inferences are clear to see. As Shoemaker puts it (via Manders-
Huits 2010), corporatised identities undermine individuals abilities to “present [their] self-identity 
to others in the manner [they] see fit”, meaning their “autonomy is undermined” as they are 
“unable to be the manager of [their] own reputation” (Shoemaker 2010, p. 13). Indeed, an 
algorithm’s mediation of digital identity performances removes “a key element of self-
determination” even if they would have shared the information themselves (Shoemaker 2010, p. 
13). In other words, individuals are reduced to their interests and behaviours as can be understood 
by these algorithms and which serve their ends (Williams 2005, p. 108). But, in these cases, an 
external imposition is clearly determining who individuals are seen to be – defining their identities 
for others by filtering posts, and hence limiting opportunities for self-determination, through the 
algorithm’s role in structuring how and what information is revealed on social media sites. 
 
 
22 Influencers might therefore fail to fulfil the authenticity conditions of self-governance.  
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§3.2.3 – Self-Authorisation  
Self-authorisation is concerned with an individual seeing themselves as deserving of self-
respect, self-trust and self-worth/esteem (MacKenzie 2019, p. 149). This reflective element is 
irreducibly social, as it is through our relationships that these evaluative attitudes are built up. 
Individuals are only ever empowered to “speak and answer” for themselves if they are treated as 
people in their own right and so regard themselves as autonomous (MacKenzie 2019, p. 149). 
Accordingly, socially stigmatising practices that undermine self-authorisation can in turn 
undermine an individuals’ self-governance and self-determination (MacKenzie 2019, p. 150).  
Immediately, and even discounting Facebook’s emotional manipulation experiments, the 
notion of self-worth can be easily linked to the expansive literature on social media’s negative 
effects on self-image. Humans naturally compare themselves with others but social media 
disproportionately exposes individuals to the highlights of others’ lives, damaging their self-esteem 
(Vogel et al. 2014, p. 206). Heavy users of social media are therefore generally more depressed 
(Feinstein et al. 2013), and report lower levels of well-being (Kalpidou et al. 2010; Shakya and 
Christakis 2017)23. Crucially, social media usage also increases the perceived gap between who 
individuals want to be and who they think they are (Haferkamp and Krämer 2010). Or, in other 
words, the gap between an individual’s idealised identities and actually performed digital identities, 
likely due in part to the re-presentation of embarrassing or outdated expressions of digital identity. 
In other words, it can damage the “properties or beliefs about ourselves we value and respond to 
emotionally in relation to our self-esteem” (Manders-Huits 2010, p. 46).  
Taken to its extreme, this alienation of the individual from themselves, and the accompanying 
erosion of self-worth and self-respect, is terminal for autonomy along this dimension. Indeed, due 
to the increased prevalence of negative self-evaluative feelings, social media users often report 
feelings of listlessness and isolation, and that they could have spent their time more fruitfully 
(Primack et al. 2017). Additionally, excessive social media usage often precludes individuals from 
pursuing activities that could actually increase genuine face-to-face interactions and a sense of 
fulfilment (Newport 2019, pp. 168–169). For some individuals, then, social media takes time away 
from more fulfilling pastimes that increase feelings of self-respect and self-esteem, directly 
undermining their sense of self-authorisation.  
 
23 It is worth noting some of these conclusions have been recently challenged by work testing the link between 
digital technology and adolescent well-being (Orben et al. 2019; Orben and Przybylski 2019), although this bears 
no impact on the identity effects that Haferkamp and Krämer researched.  
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What is more, algorithms are inherently socially stigmatising, given that they operate through 
classification at a generalisable level: they are, quite literally, stereotyping processes24. It is this that 
allows companies to use individuals as a means to their economic ends. However, stigmatisation 
that treats people as less than human can damage self-trust and their understanding of their own 
digital identities. Not only can individuals surrender to algorithmic choices in the face of 
complexity, but self-authorisation clearly plays a role here, as regarding oneself as unable to make 
a competent autonomous choice betrays a lack of self-respect and self-trust. Indeed, one reason 
for handing more responsibility for decisions over to algorithms is that they are often regarded by 
the public to be more competent choosers (Zittrain 2019); algorithms are trusted to have ‘gotten 
it right’, so individuals often feel they should obediently follow recommendations suitable for ‘their’ 
category (de Vries 2010, p. 82). Algorithms, though, only identify statistical correlations between 
datapoints, not causal links (Zittrain 2019) – there is no reasoning taking place. Taken in by a 
veneer of algorithmic competency, reliance on machine intelligences can thereby weaken an 
individual’s understanding of their own identities, challenging who they believe themselves to be 
and altering the ways in which they perform their identities at the expense of self-authorisation.  
Finally, it is vital to remember that algorithmic curators have no respect or understanding for 
individuals as people – they are, after all, only members of a set. There is no social relationship 
between the algorithmic ‘audience’ and performer; the relationship is parasitic (Hildebrandt 2019, 
p. 107). Their aim, additionally, is not to support identity experimentation but to encourage reliance 
and addiction in order to generate corporatised identities that can be monetised. Autonomous 
control over digital identities is therefore undermined through a process explicitly designed to 
generate reliance and compliance with a corporatised classification. These algorithms are, quite 
literally, “traps” that measure success in terms of their “captivation” and retention of individuals 
(Seaver 2018, p. 9). I can think of no better metaphor for an autonomy-decreasing mechanism 
than this. Consequently, and in concert with my previous points, this underlines why a return to 
the encouragement of digital identities, which individuals can not only exert control over, but also 
socially perform and develop, is so urgently required. 
 
24 Categorisation appears in traditional marketing but, when achieved algorithmically, deep granularity results in 
categorically different predictive abilities (See e.g. Canny et al. 2011). 
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Concluding Remarks 
This could all understandably be read in oppressively bleak terms. But, in closing, I want to 
emphasise that it need not be like this. The relatively unfettered performance of digital identities 
used to motivate most social media interactions and shows that corporatised identities are not 
essential for a flourishing social media environment; they are a parasitic addition whose uptake has 
been driven by a recent drive for monetisation. Nonetheless, social media now permeates every 
second and sphere of daily life, ensuring that individuals’ significant options, values and 
preferences are being constantly conditioned and constrained by a consumerist agenda. This, 
however, is a choice, and one that could be overturned in favour of a less harmful mechanism for 
monetisation. Regardless, on the account I have given here, the production and utilisation of 
corporatised identities cannot endure without continuing to harm individuals’ performances of 
their authentic digital identities, limiting their relational autonomy in a way that I do not believe is 
compatible with either liberal democratic respect for autonomy or regard for their (eudaimonic) 
digital well-being.  
So, in summary, having distinguished the constitutive elements of expressions of digital 
identity towards the beginning of this chapter, I then explained how corporatised identities are 
being conflated with digital identities proper. This, I believe, constitutes a useful theoretical 
contribution to modern Goffmanian identity theory and helps expose how the displacement of 
digital identities on social media has come to potentially undermine individual autonomy when 
understood in relational terms. Indeed, I have argued that designing social media sites around the 
algorithmic production of corporatised identities, at the expense of individuals’ digital identities, 
has likely undermined their self-governance, self-determination, and self-authorisation. It was for 
these reasons that I concluded that digital identities must once again be allowed to motivate 
individuals’ interactions on social media unencumbered. Only upon doing so can those individuals’ 
digital well-being, and control over their own digital identities, be rendered compatible with social 
media. 
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